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Abstract
People typically extend limited moral standing to animals reared for food. Prominent perspectives in
the literature on animal-human relations characterize this phenomenon as an outcome of moral
disengagement: in other words, a strategy that protects people from moral self-condemnation. To
provide a direct test of this hypothesis, we exposed people to a self-affirmation manipulation, and
hypothesized that this would lead them to be more critical of their own meat eating and be more
appreciative of animals’ minds and suffering. Three experiments tested this idea in meat-eaters from
the United Kingdom. Two initial experiments (n = 244, n = 247) found that affirming the self made
eating animals seem more morally wrong. However, a subsequent pre-registered experiment (n =
719) failed to replicate this effect. In addition, this experiment found no effects of the affirmation
procedure on specific beliefs about eating animals that participants consume compared to animals
they do not consume. A mini-meta analysis of all the experiments found only weak evidence in
support of the idea that affirming the self makes eating meat seem more morally wrong. There was
no evidence that the affirmation procedure affected beliefs about animal minds.
Keywords: Meat, Animals, Morality, Self-affirmation
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The ‘me’ in meat: Does affirming the self make eating animals seem more morally wrong?
Meat consumption and factory farming raise important moral questions about animal
welfare (Dhont & Hodson, 2020; Joy, 2010; Singer, 2009). The increasing popularity of vegetarian and
meat-free substitutes (Ruby, 2012; Sadler, 2004) suggests that moral concerns surrounding animal
welfare are gaining traction (see also Dhont et al., 2019; Dhont & Hodson, 2020). However, and at
the same time, people have a tendency to disengage from these concerns. A growing body of work is
predicated on the idea that this is driven by a need to preserve a positive self-image (Bastian &
Loughnan, 2017; Loughnan & Davies, 2020; Rothgerber, 2020). We provide the most direct test of
this view to date by examining whether affirming the self makes people more critical of meat
consumption and more appreciative of animals’ minds and suffering.
1.1. Meat eating and moral disengagement
Moral disengagement refers to the psychological removal of self-sanctions from moral
behaviour (Bandura, 1999). Scholars propose that moral disengagement surrounding meat eating
and animal welfare is prevalent (Bastian & Loughnan, 2017; Joy, 2010; Loughnan & Davies, 2020;
Piazza et al., 2015; Rothgerber, 2020). People typically rationalize the indirect harms caused by meat
eating by virtue of it being nice, necessary, normal, and natural. Piazza et al. (2015) identified these
rationalizations as the ‘four N’s’ of meat consumption and found that the more people endorsed
these justifications the less they saw eating meat as morally problematic. Other work suggests that
people tend to morally disengage by minimizing the harms inflicted on animals reared for food.
These animals are assumed to possess less sophisticated minds compared to other animals (Bastian
et al., 2012); leading people to be less concerned about their welfare (Bratanova et al., 2011; Leach
et al., 2020; Leite et al., 2019). Taken together, this work shows that moral disengagement
surrounding meat eating is characterized by reduced concern for the welfare of food animals, and
skepticism about their mental sophistication.
Moral disengagement can serve to protect individuals from self-condemnation by making
behaviours seem more permissible (Bandura, 1999). This is important to people because maintaining
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a positive view of the self is desirable and adaptive (Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Aquino & Reed II, 2002;
Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Many
scholars have argued that disengagement from the moral issues surrounding meat eating is caused
by threats to peoples’ self image (Bastian & Loughnan, 2017; Joy, 2010; Loughnan & Davies, 2020;
Piazza et al., 2015; Rothgerber, 2020). This threat is thought to be aggravated by the ‘meat paradox’:
people care about animals but are complicit in their suffering and death (Bastian & Loughnan, 2017;
Loughnan & Davies, 2020).
A basic premise of these accounts is that eating meat conflicts with broader prohibitions
against harm and can therefore present an unfavorable view of the self. It is for this reason that
people are thought to minimize the moral issues surrounding meat eating and animal welfare. For
example, Piazza et al. (2015) argue that common justifications (e.g., “A lot of other people eat meat“)
can persuade others of the legitimacy of one's actions which, in turn, could make it easier to avoid
self-condemnation. Bastian et al. (2012) argued that people underestimate food animals' minds, and
therefore their capacity to be harmed, for similar reasons. The strongest form of this perspective
states that moral disengagement is specifically caused by a desire to protect the self and not by other
mechanisms such as expectancy violation or visceral reactions to harm (Bastian & Loughnan, 2017).
Conceptualizing the psychology of meat eating in these terms implies that the desire to avoid
self-condemnation is a driving force behind moral beliefs about meat eating, animal minds, and
animal welfare.
1.2. Implicating the self in moral disengagement about meat eating
Research has made considerable headway in implicating the self in moral disengagement
about meat eating and animal welfare. In one study, meat eaters judged a cow as less mentally
sophisticated, and therefore less able to suffer, if they were led to believe it was destined to be
butchered (vs. live out its life on the farm; Bastian et al., 2012). In another study, participants who
had recently eaten beef jerky (vs. nuts) reported less moral concern for cows (Loughnan et al., 2010).
This latter finding, especially, is consistent with the idea that moral disengagement is driven by
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threats to the self. If ever the morality of eating animals and their capacity to be harmed is likely to
be self-relevant it is after having just eaten meat.
Though the desire to protect the self is a plausible explanation of these results, other
explanations remain viable. For example, people could downplay animals’ capacity to be harmed
after considering how they are butchered because they are averse to harm and are motivated to
minimize it (Cushman et al., 2012). Likewise, shifts in moral concern for animals that occur post
meat-eating could be due to people inferring their attitudes after-the-fact from their behavior. The
idea here is that when asked about meat eating and animal welfare, a person might consider their
recent choices and infer from them that they do not care much about food animals (Bem, 1967;
Loughnan et al., 2010). These are not mutually exclusive accounts of why people believe what they
do about meat eating and food animals. It is likely that each explanation, including the self-protective
account, explains some part of the phenomena. These arguments do, however, suggest that there is
a need for further data on how self-protective processes are related to beliefs about meat eating and
farm animals. One way to move forward is by addressing the self-concept directly, either by
manipulation or measurement.
Self-affirmation theory (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988) suggests that perceptions of
the self change as a function of whether the current domain of focus affords a positive view of the
self. As a result, threats to the self can be ameliorated by affirming a domain of self-integrity that is
unrelated to the present threat (Harris & Napper, 2005; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; Sherman et al.,
2000). This perspective suggests that if the need to protect the self is driving moral disengagement,
then moral judgements ought to fluctuate as a function of whether people have recently affirmed
the self. This can be tested by having participants affirm an important value or source of integrity
that is peripheral to the threat at hand (McQueen & Klein, 2006). Specifically, bringing attention to a
personal domain of value allows people to retain a sense of integrity in the face of threats to a
different domain. For example, affirming the self makes people more likely to admit personally
contributing to climate (Sparks et al., 2010) and to be less defensive when apologizing for offending
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or hurting someone (Schumann, 2014). If people are more prone to acknowledging that their
behaviour may be morally problematic under these conditions, the self-concept is directly implicated
(Sherman & Cohen, 2006).
1.3. Present research
The present research investigates the role of the self in beliefs about eating meat, animal
minds, and animal welfare. We focus on these judgements because they are pathways through which
threats to the self can likely be minimized. We exposed an experimental group of participants to a
self-affirmation procedure (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). We examine whether, compared to control
participants, this causes them to indicate that eating animals is morally wrong, ascribe mental
capacities to animals, and appreciate their suffering. Our reason is that these findings would directly
implicate the desire to defend a positive self-concept in perceptions of animals and meat
consumption.
2. Experiments 1a & 1b: Initial Data
Experiments 1a and 1b provided an initial indication of whether fluctuations in the self affect
moral beliefs about eating meat. Using a classic affirmation paradigm, these experiments
investigated if affirming the self affected moral judgements about eating meat. Participants wrote
either about a time when they expressed a central value or when someone else expressed a
peripheral value (McQueen & Klein, 2006). Participants then briefly considered the moral issues
surrounding meat eating and judged how morally wrong it is to eat meat, the extent to which food
animals possess minds, and the extent to which they suffered in slaughterhouses. In addition,
Experiment 1b explored the potential boundary conditions of these effects by examining how
affirming the self affected moral beliefs that presumably posed less of a threat to the self. We chose
to examine beliefs about prostitution here because prostitution is a moralized behaviour that
participants are presumably unlikely to have engaged in and can therefore judge without tacitly
threatening the self. We expected participants who have affirmed the self (compared to participants
who have not) to judge that eating meat is more morally wrong, that food animals possess more
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sophisticated minds, and that food animals suffer more in slaughterhouses. We also expected the
affirmation procedure to more strongly affect moral judgements about eating meat compared to
moral judgements about prostitution.
2.1. Method
The raw data and analysis scripts are available via the Open Science Framework
(https://osf.io/jp6s7/).
2.1.1. Participants and Design
Samples. We aimed to recruit 250 participants for each experiment. Participants were from
the United Kingdom and recruited from the crowdsourcing platform Prolific in exchange for £0.45.
Experiment 1a consisted of 253 participants and Experiment 1b of 252 participants. Participants
were pre-screened to be meat-eaters. Some participants nevertheless indicated they did not eat
meat (nexp1a = 4, nexp1b = 5; “I do not eat meat”) or any animal products (nexp1a = 1, nexp1b = 4; “I do not
eat meat or animal products”) and were therefore excluded. The final sample sizes were 244 (150
female; Mage = 35.93, SDage = 11.91) and 247 (176 female; Mage = 36.27, SD = 12.09). No data were
analyzed prior to reaching the full sample size.
Statistical power. We subscribe to the conventional apha level (α = .050) and employ
two-tailed tests. A power analysis conducted via the pwr package for R (Champely, 2020) suggested
that the final samples (nexp1a = 244, nexp1b = 247) afforded 80% power to detect an effect of affirmation
of the following magnitude: d = .36. The combined sample (ntotal = 491) afforded 80% power to
detect an effect of affirmation of the following magnitude: d = .25. A power analysis conducted via
the Superpower package for R (Lakens & Caldwell, 2019) suggested that Experiment 1b afforded 80%
power to detect a two-way interaction of the following magnitude: ηp2 = .035.
Design. Participants in both experiments were randomly assigned to one of two conditions in
a between-participants design (affirmation: affirmed vs. non-affirmed). Experiment 1b included an
additional within-participants factor (judgement: eating meat vs. engaging in prostitution). The
research was approved by an internal ethical review board in compliance with British Psychological
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Society’s code of ethics and conduct. All participants provided informed consent prior to
participation. We report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions.
2.1.2. Procedure and Materials
The procedure was largely identical for both experiments. We begin by describing the procedure
for Experiment 1a. Participants completed a conventional self-affirmation value-ranking task (e.g.,
McQueen & Klein, 2006), in which they ordered ten values from most to least important (living in the
moment, politics, relationships with friends and family, loyalty and integrity, religious values, sense of
humour, contributions to society, democracy and equal rights, creativity, and intellectual curiosity).
Further details on the distribution of selected values can be found in the Supplementary Material.
Participants in the self-affirmation condition then wrote about a time in which their highest-ranked
value was particularly important to them and how it affected their behaviour. Participants in the
non-self-affirmation condition wrote about a time in which their lowest-ranked value could be
important to someone else and how it could affect their behaviour. Participants were then prompted
to briefly consider the moral issues surrounding meat eating. Then, participants judged the moral
wrongness of eating meat (“How morally wrong[bad] is it to eat meat?”, as > .94)1, the extent to
which farm animals used for food are capable of six mental capacities (“To what extent are farm
animals capable of thought [planning/remembering/fear/pain/ pleasure]?”; as > .83) and the extent
to which animals in slaughterhouses suffer (“To what extent do farm animals in slaughterhouses
suffer?“). We chose the mental capacities as they reflect general aspects of mind that are
theoretically important and empirically grounded (e.g., H. M. Gray et al., 2007). All items were
anchored from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Finally, participants identified their dietary habits (“I
eat meat” vs. “I do not eat meat” vs. “I do not eat any animal products”).
1 Participants in Experiment 1a also judged the importance of reducing their meat consumption on a
single-item measure (“How important is it that I make an effort to reduce meat consumption?“),  from 1 (not at
all) to 7 (very much). Participants who affirmed a central value believed that it was more important to reduce
their meat consumption (M = 4.77, SD = 1.75) compared to participants who had not affirmed a central value
(M = 4.29, SD = 1.91), t(242) = 2.03, p = .044, d = 0.26, 95% CI [0.01, 0.51].
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The procedure for Experiment 1b was largely identical. Participants completed the same
affirmation task, then briefly considered the moral issues surrounding meat eating and judged how
morally wrong it is to eat meat, the extent to which food animals possess minds, and the extent to
which food animals suffered in slaughterhouses. The measures were identical to those in Experiment
1a. In addition, participants were asked to briefly consider the moral issues surrounding prostitution
and to judge the moral wrongness of engaging in prostitution (“How morally wrong[bad] it is to
engage in prostitution?”, a = .97), from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). The order of the topics (meat
eating vs. prostitution) was randomized. Participants then identified their dietary habits in the same
manner as in Experiment 1a. At the conclusion of both studies, participants were debriefed, thanked,
and paid.
2.2. Results and Discussion
To provide the most reliable estimates we present meta-level coefficients derived from
analyzing the data across both experiments (Goh et al., 2016). Further details on study-level effects
are available in the Supplementary Material. Effect sizes are estimated from standardized mean
differences (Cohen’s d) and weighted via an inverse-variance method (Schwarzer et al., 2015).
Affirming a central value made eating meat seem more morally wrong. Affirmed participants
reported that eating meat was more morally wrong (Experiment 1a: M = 3.25, SD = 1.65; Experiment
1b: M = 3.27, SD = 1.68) than non-affirmed participants (Experiment 1a: M = 2.82, SD = 1.65;
Experiment 1b: M = 2.86, SD = 1.57), d = 0.26, 95% CI [0.08, 0.44], Z = 2.84, p = .005.
Next we tested if affirming the self affected judgements about animal minds and suffering.
We found no evidence that affirmed (Experiment 1a: M = 5.22, SD = 1.02; Experiment 1b: M = 5.25,
SD = 1.08) and non-affirmed (Experiment 1a: M= 5.26, SD = 1.09; Experiment 1b: M = 5.21, SD =
1.04) participants differed in the degree to which they believed food animals possessed minds, d <
0.01, 95% CI [-0.17, 0.18], Z = 0.04, p = .971. Nor did we they find any evidence that affirmed
(Experiment 1a: M = 4.95, SD = 1.36; Experiment 1b: M = 4.87, SD = 1.59) and non-affirmed
(Experiment 1a: M = 4.87, SD = 1.52; Experiment 1b: M = 4.73, SD = 1.58) participants differed in the
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extent to which they believed animals suffered in slaughterhouses, d = 0.07, 95% CI [-0.11, 0.25], Z =
0.80, p = .425.
Finally in Experiment 1b, we examined how affirming the self affected beliefs about a
behaviour that presumably posed less of a threat to the self--prostitution. An Analysis of Variance
with 2 (affirmed vs. non-affirmed) x 2 (meat eating vs. prostitution) revealed no strong evidence that
the affirmation procedure differentially affected moral judgements towards meat eating compared to
prostitution, F(1, 245) = 3.61, p = .058, ηp2 = .01. Further tests suggested that there was no evidence
in support of the idea that affirming the self (M = 3.95, SD = 2.09), compared to not affirming the self
(M = 4.17, SD = 2.01), affects moral judgements of prostitution, t(245) = -0.81, p = .416, d = -0.10,
95% CI [-0.35, 0.15].
The results from Experiments 1a and 1b provide some initial evidence of a causal link
between perceptions of the self and the propensity to believe that meat eating is morally
problematic. The data were inconclusive with regards to whether affirming the self affects how
people perceive animal minds and suffering. Finally, we found some weak evidence in support of the
idea that affirming the self more strongly affects moral beliefs that pose a threat to the self (about
meat eating) compared to beliefs that do not pose a threat to the self (about prostitution).
3. Experiment 2: Direct Replication and Extension
Experiment 2 aimed to provide more definitive evidence by testing if the effect of affirming
the self on judgements about eating animals replicates in a new and larger sample. We did this by
exposing participants to the same affirmation procedure and then measuring the same beliefs as in
Experiments 1a and 1b: whether it is morally wrong to eat meat, and the extent to which animals
reared for food possess minds and suffer in slaughterhouses. Our first prediction was that we would
observe a similar effect as that obtained in Experiments 1a and 1b: that affirming the self makes
eating meat (in general) seem more morally wrong.
In addition, Experiment 2 provided a more stringent test of whether affirming the self makes
eating animals seem more morally wrong by reducing threats to the self. It achieved this by eliciting
SELF-AFFIRMATION MEAT EATING 11
two additional beliefs: whether it is morally wrong to eat an animal that participants themselves
consume (e.g., pigs) and whether it is morally wrong to eat an animal that participants themselves
do not consume (e.g., donkeys). On the basis that it is threatening to the self to judge one’s own
actions as morally problematic, our second prediction was that affirming the self should make eating
pigs seem more morally wrong. On the basis that it is especially threatening to judge one’s own
actions (vs. actions that one does not perform) as morally problematic, our third prediction was that
affirming the self should make eating pigs seem more morally wrong than it does eating donkeys.
Support for this third prediction would therefore be strongly indicative of a self-protective
motivation. Absence of support for the third prediction, in the context of support for the first and
second prediction, would not rule out a self-protective motivation. The defences that people erect to
justify their consumption of meat might generalize to animals that do not form part of their own
diet. However, it would leave open alternative accounts that would need to be addressed in future
research projects.
3.1. Method
Experiment 2 was pre-registered. The approved (Stage 1) protocol, raw data, and analysis
scripts are available via the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/jp6s7/).
3.1.1. Stimulus pretest
Prior to conducting the main test, we sought to identify a pair of suitable animals, one that is
typically eaten and one that is not, to serve as stimulus targets. One-hundred self-identified meat
eaters from a university in the United Kingdom (70 female; Mage = 19.15, SDage = 0.90) reported their
beliefs about cows, pigs, sheep, tapirs, wildebeests, and donkeys. These beliefs included:
consumption behaviour (“Do you eat meat or edible products made from [animal]?”; yes vs. no),
moral beliefs about eating the animal (“How morally wrong it is to eat [animal]s?”, “How morally bad
is it to eat [animal]s?”, “Do [animal]s deserve to be protected from being eaten?”, “If meat from a
[animal] was on the menu at a restaurant, would you avoid ordering it to reduce the number of
[animal]s being killed?”; as > .78), and beliefs about the animals’ mind, (“To what extent are
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[animal]s capable of thought [planning/remembering/fear/pain/ pleasure]?”; as > .82). All items
were anchored from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). We employed the following criteria to select the
final pair of animals: i) one animal should be eaten by a majority or all of participants, ii) one animal
should be eaten by a minority or no participants, and, iii) beliefs about the sophistication of the
animals’ minds should not differ. On the basis of these criteria, we selected pigs and donkeys. Almost
all participants ate pigs (93/100) whilst almost no participants ate donkeys (3/100). Pigs were
perceived to be less morally wrong to eat (M = 3.01, SD = 1.11) than donkeys (M = 3.40, SD = 1.21),
t(99) = -2.82, p = .006, d = -0.28, 95% CI [-0.48, -0.08]. Importantly, this meant that the mean ratings
were roughly two standard deviations or more away from either response pole, suggesting that
ceiling and floor effects should not emerge in Experiment 2. There was no evidence that pigs were
perceived to possess more, or less, sophisticated minds (M = 5.08, SD = 1.22) than donkeys (M =
5.05, SD = 1.22), t(99) = -0.27, p = .787, d = -0.03, 95% CI [-0.17, 0.22]. Further descriptive statistics
for all animals are provided in the Supplementary Material.
3.1.2. Participants and Design
Sample size justification. We aimed for greater than 90% power when testing the effect of
self affirmation on moral beliefs about eating animals. We subscribed to the conventional alpha level
(α = .050) and employed one-tailed tests. We employed one-tailed tests because we see no basis for
predicting the reverse pattern of results. We assumed that the true effect of self affirmation on
moral beliefs about animals is of the magnitude we observed in Experiments 1a and 1b (d = 0.26).
Given these parameters, a power analysis conducted via the pwr package for R (Champely, 2020)
suggested that a sample of 750 would afford greater than 97% power to detect the expected effect
of self affirmation on moral beliefs about eating meat. When testing the moderating effects of self
affirmation on moral beliefs about eating animals that participants eat (vs. do not eat), we assumed
that the true effect of self affirmation on moral beliefs about animals that participants eat is the
same as the effect on general beliefs about meat eating (d = 0.26). We assume that the true effect of
self affirmation on moral beliefs about animals that participants do not eat is zero (d = 0.00). The
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expected results correspond to a two-way interaction of the following magnitude: ηp2 = .017.
Simulating 10000 samples via the Superpower package for R (Lakens & Caldwell, 2019) suggested
that 750 participants would provide greater than 92% power to detect the two-way interaction
between affirmation (affirmed vs. not affirmed) and animal (eaten vs. not eaten). The data from
Experiments 1a and 1b indicate that the effect of affirmation on judgements about animal minds and
suffering are likely to be very small (d < 0.07). We did not use these estimates in our sample-size
determination as we did not have the resources to acquire a sample that would be adequately
powered to detect an effect of this magnitude (n > 7000 to achieve greater than 90% power).
We aimed to recruit 825 adults from the United Kingdom via Prolific. This included 75
additional participants (+10%) above and beyond the target sample size of 750 to allow for additional
exclusions. We based this on the number of participants in Experiments 1a and 1b who reported that
they do not eat meat (3%), and the number of participants in Experiment 2’s pre-test who reported
that they do not eat specific animals (presented above; 10%).
Sample. We achieved the target sample of 825. Participants were pre-screened via Prolific’s
filters to exclude those who do not consume meat. Thirty-five participants nevertheless indicated
they did not eat meat (n = 29; “I do not eat meat”) or any animal products (n = 6; “I do not eat meat
or animal products”) and were therefore excluded. In addition, 72 participants indicated that they
either did not consume meat or products made from pigs or did consume meat from donkeys and
were therefore excluded. The final sample size was 721 (408 female; Mage = 39.57, SDage = 14.50). No
data were analyzed prior to reaching the full sample size.
Statistical power. A power analysis conducted via the pwr package for R (Champely, 2020)
suggested that the final sample afforded greater than 96% power (one-tailed, α = .050) to detect an
effect of self affirmation on moral beliefs about eating meat of the following magnitude: d = 0.26.
Simulating 10000 samples via the Superpower package for R (Lakens & Caldwell, 2019) suggested
that the final sample afforded greater than 90% power (one-tailed, α = .050) to detect a moderating
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effect of self affirmation on moral beliefs about eating animals that participants eat (vs. those they
do not eat) of the following magnitude: ηp2 = .017.
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one condition in a 2 between (affirmation:
affirmed vs. non-affirmed) x 2 within (animal: eaten vs. not eaten) design. The research adhered to
the same ethical guidelines outlined in Experiments 1a and 1b (see section 2.1.1.).
3.1.2. Procedure and Materials
We utilized the same affirmation paradigm as in Experiments 1a and 1b (see McQueen & Klein,
2006). Participants were then prompted to briefly consider the moral issues surrounding meat eating
and afterwards to judge: the moral wrongness of eating meat (“How morally wrong[bad] it is to eat
meat?”, a = .94), the extent to which farm animals used for food are capable of six mental capacities
(“To what extent are farm animals capable of thought [planning/remembering/fear/pain/
pleasure]?”, a = .86), and the extent to which animals in slaughterhouses suffer (“To what extent do
farm animals in slaughterhouses suffer?“). These judgements were elicited directly after the
affirmation procedure and were separated from the judgements about specific animals (described
below). This ensured the general judgements were not contaminated by specific judgements and
allowed us to directly replicate Experiments 1a and 1b.
After these measures, participants briefly considered the moral issues surrounding eating pigs
and judged the moral wrongness of eating pigs, and then briefly considered the moral issues
surrounding eating donkeys and judged the moral wrongness of eating donkeys. Moral judgements
were measured on four items (“How morally wrong it is to eat [animal]s?”, “How morally bad is it to
eat [animal]s?”, “Do [animal]s deserve to be protected from being eaten?”, “If meat from a [animal]
was on the menu at a restaurant, would you avoid ordering it to reduce the number of [animal]s
being killed?”, as > .91), anchored from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). The order of the animals (pigs
vs. donkeys) was randomized.
Finally, participants were asked about their dietary habits. Participants identified their dietary
habits (“I eat meat” vs. “I do not eat meat” vs. “I do not eat any animal products”) and if they eat
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pigs and donkeys (“Do you eat meat or edible products made from [animal]?”; yes vs. no). At the
conclusion of the study, participants were debriefed, thanked, and paid.
3.2. Results
Confirmatory Analyses. We tested our first prediction--affirming the self makes eating meat
(in general) seem more morally wrong--in two ways. First, we tested if the data from the present
experiment supported this prediction. In this experiment, we found no indication that participants
who had undergone the affirmation procedure (M = 2.64, SD = 1.50) believed that eating meat was
more morally wrong than participants who had not (M = 2.57, SD = 1.40), t(719) = 0.58, pone-tailed =
.281, d = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.10; 0.19]. Next, we examined if the full data (Experiments 1-2) supported
the prediction. We tested this by estimating the standardized mean difference (Cohen’s d) weighted
via an inverse-variance method (Schwarzer et al., 2015). We pre-registered a more stringent alpha
level for this test (α = .005; Benjamin et al., 2018). Tested against this criterion, the tendency for the
affirmation procedure to make eating meat seem more morally wrong was not statistically significant
across the experiments, d = 0.13, 95% CI [0.02, 0.24], Z = 2.29, pone-tailed = .011.
Figure 1
The effects of affirmation on moral judgements about meat eating
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Note. Higher scores reflect more morally wrong/bad to eat. The figure depicts jittered data points
(points), means (diamonds), and 95% CIs (whiskers).
Moving on, we tested our second prediction--affirming the self makes eating pigs seem more
morally wrong--and third prediction--affirming the self makes eating pigs seem more morally wrong
than it does eating donkeys. We found no indication that the affirmation procedure, compared to a
control procedure, made eating pigs seem more morally wrong, t(719) = -0.41, pone-tailed = .659, d =
-0.03, 95% CI [-0.18; 0.12]. There was no evidence that the affirmation procedure made eating pigs
seem more morally wrong than eating donkeys, F(1, 719) = 0.83, p = .363, ηp2 < .01. Further
descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.
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Figure 2
The effects of affirmation on moral judgements about eating animals that participants eat (pigs) and
do not eat (donkeys)
Note. Higher scores reflect more morally wrong to eat. The figure depicts jittered data points
(points), means (diamonds), and 95% CIs (whiskers).
Additional Analyses. We also examined if the affirmation procedure affected beliefs about
animal minds and suffering. Looking across all the available data, we found no evidence that
affirming the self affected beliefs about animal minds, d = -0.01, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.10], Z = -0.20, p =
.843; nor did we find any evidence that affirming the self affected beliefs about the extent to which
animals suffer in slaughterhouses, d = 0.07, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.19], Z = 1.29, p = .197.
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4. General Discussion
Prominent perspectives suggest that people minimize the moral issues surrounding meat
eating and animal welfare so as to preserve a favourable view of the self (Bastian & Loughnan, 2017;
Joy, 2010; Loughnan & Davies, 2020; Piazza et al., 2015; Rothgerber, 2020). We tested this idea in
three experiments by having participants complete a self affirmation task and predicted that this
ought to make eating animals seem more wrong. We also tested if the potential effects of this task
extended to beliefs about animals that are eaten (i.e., pigs) and to animals that are not eaten (i.e.,
donkeys); and to beliefs about animal minds and animal suffering. The evidence only weakly
supported the idea that affirming the self makes eating meat seem more morally wrong: the effect
aggregated across all experiments was small (d = .13), and did not achieve statistical significance
against the pre-registered alpha level of .005. We found no evidence that affirming the self affected
specific beliefs about the moral wrongness of eating animals that participants themselves consume
and do not consume, nor about their mental capacities.
The present findings do not undermine the fact that people tend to deny moral standing and
sentience to food animals. There is reliable evidence to suggest that people readily justify the harms
inflicted on food animals (Piazza et al., 2015) and that food animals garner less moral concern (Krings
et al., in press; Leite et al., 2019), and are perceived to possess less sophisticated minds, compared to
other comparable animals (Bastian et al., 2012; Bratanova et al., 2011; Possidónio et al., 2019). The
importance of these findings for how we relate to animals remains.
The present findings do, however, speak to whether the self is implicated in moral
disengagement surrounding meat eating and animal minds. Prior work demonstrates that moral
beliefs shift when the inconsistency between eating meat and caring for animals is brought into focus
(Bastian et al., 2012; Loughnan et al., 2010; Rothgerber, 2014). For example, Loughnan et al., (2010)
found that meat-eaters reported that cows were less worthy of moral concern after having eaten
beef jerky compared to nuts. Such results suggest that the need to represent the self in positive
terms is implicated in moral beliefs about eating animals (Bastian & Loughnan, 2017; Loughnan &
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Davies, 2020). We present evidence that manipulating the need to represent the self in positive
terms has little or no effect on moral beliefs about eating meat, animal minds, and animal suffering.
This suggests that perceptions of the self may not be as strongly tied to such beliefs as previously
thought. In doing so, the work suggests that alternative explanations of the phenomena--in terms of
aversion to harm (Cushman et al., 2012) and non-motivated self-knowledge (Bem, 1967; Loughnan et
al., 2010)--may need to be taken more seriously. This does not mean that perceptions of the self are
not implicated in moral disengagement surrounding meat eating and animal welfare. The
self-protective explanation may ultimately remain the most convincing account of why people
morally disengage when the inconsistency between eating meat and caring for animals is made
salient (Bastian et al., 2012; Loughnan et al., 2010). This does, however, suggest that strong claims
about the links between perceptions of the self and the tendency to morally disengage from the
issues surrounding meat eating and animal welfare need to be made cautiously.
Affirmation procedures show some promise in applied contexts. For example, augmenting
otherwise threatening health messages with brief affirmations increases their effectiveness (Arpan et
al., 2017). Such results prompt a discussion about whether the present findings lend themselves to
similar applications. Attempts to translate the present work to such applications seem premature.
Our results tentatively suggest that one instantiation of an affirmation procedure might lend itself to
shifting general beliefs about eating meat. More data is needed to reduce the uncertainty
surrounding this effect. If this effect can be convincingly demonstrated, further work would then be
needed to confirm that similar shifts could be obtained with affirmations that are communicated in
more applied settings--such as alongside animal welfare messages. Finally, those interested in
drawing on scientific research to inform interventions need to consider their likely effectiveness. Our
results suggest that the effect of the present affirmation procedure is unlikely to be large. Although
small effects can have tangible benefits in the aggregate (Funder & Ozer, 2019), the relative costs and
benefits of such an intervention need to be weighed against potential alternatives (see e.g., Hansen
et al., 2019).
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In closing, we would like to take a moment to reflect on the value, in our view, of the
registered report format in advancing psychological science. Prior to submitting the registered
report, we found some initial support for our main hypothesis in Experiments 1a and 1b.
Nevertheless, the results from Experiments 1a and 1b were somewhat unconvincing and suggested
that a replication attempt would be beneficial but require a substantial investment of resources. The
registered report format allowed us to propose this replication and ultimately commit these
resources with the guarantee that the results would be published. The format therefore allowed us
to detach the test from the results and in doing so freed us from the disincentives associated with
attempting to publish a set of potentially inconclusive or null results. The benefits of this format are
evident. Experiment 2 failed to replicate the results of Experiment 1a and 1b, gave us a more reliable
aggregate estimate of the magnitude and robustness of the effect, and ultimately changed the
report, from one titled: “The ‘me’ in meat: Affirming the self makes eating animals seem more
morally wrong” to “The ‘me’ in meat: Does affirming the self make eating animals seem more
morally wrong?”.
In sum, we tested if moral beliefs about meat eating, animal minds, and animal suffering
were causally related to the need to protect the self by examining the effects of an affirmation
procedure on such beliefs. We found only weak support for the idea that affirming the self makes
eating meat seem more morally wrong. We found no evidence that affirming the self affected any
other beliefs including those related to eating specific animals, animal minds, and animal suffering.
The work suggests that claims about why people are prone to deny moral standing and sentience to
food animals need to be made cautiously.
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